MI5 on Hunger Strike

[Mr Crowley]

MI5 on Hunger Strike

March 19, 2009 · Print This Article

“There was absolutely no change in the government’s position.”

An unpublished interview with Sir John Blelloch, a member of MI5 who had been seconded to the NIO as a Deputy Secretary at the time of the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes, has come into the possession of the Bobby Sands Trust. The interview was conducted at the British Ministry of Defence in late September 1986 [where Blelloch was Permanent Under Secretary] by the author of ‘Biting At The Grave’, Padraig O’Malley, professor at the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

What is important about the interview is that it represents an insight into the psyche of the British at crucial periods in the hunger strikes, particularly at the time of mediation attempts by others, including the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace [ICJP].

O’Malley twice interviewed Blelloch: in September 1986 and again on 23rd November 1988. Below is an unedited extract from the September 1986 interview dealing with the death of IRA Volunteer Joe McDonnell, and is followed by Blelloch’s analysis of the first hunger strike. It is illuminating in that the interview was conducted long before the publication of ‘Ten Men Dead’, which reveals the republican analysis, and it shows the intransigence of the British government throughout both hunger strikes.

Padraig O’Malley [P.O’M]: On the second hunger strike, were there any differences, again the assumptions made, which influenced how policy was made?

John Blelloch [JB]: No, I don’t think so. I’m afraid, of course, that we all, I think, realised that the second hunger strike was more likely to lead to someone dying, particularly as we read, as I read, Sands’ personality. He, having been the leader the first time round, volunteered himself for the second. He did so in a way which left him personally very exposed if only because he went on first himself. I don’t think that was an accident. I think it’s very probable that Sands was determined to put himself in a position in which he did not have to take the decision that somebody else should die, which, of course, was the position that the leader of the first group was in. So, when the second strike was announced, I think most of us felt that Sands personally, and maybe some others, would go through with it, but the issues, I’m afraid, seemed to be what they were before. One response to the new situation was that we continued to be, I think, pretty generous in the facilities that we allowed for third parties to go in and see for themselves and talk to the prisoners and, as you’ve spoken to Michael Alison [Prisons Minister], no doubt he’s talked to you about the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace which I think was the last major effort by third parties to do something about this. But I think the issues were the same.

P.O’M: Let’s talk about that. In fact, if you wouldn’t mind, I might come back to see you again in November sometime because I’ll have this typed up and sent on to you in the meantime and it’ll allow me to get so far because there’ll be some ancillary questions that I’ll have. But that period, I think it was from the 3rd to the 11th of July when the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace…

JB: I’m sure you’ve got the dates right. I thought it was slightly earlier than that, I must say.

P.O’M: There was two rounds of meetings, I think. One was in late June…

JB: Well, I remember four meetings, I think, altogether. But, anyway, the facts can be established.

P.O’M: These were the meetings just before Joe McDonnell died and again I think it was a meeting on a Friday which extended well into a Saturday and then the Irish Commission when to the Maze, met with the prisoners and the relatives, came back and met with Mr Alison again and then, according to their version of events, again I think it was you, a senior civil servant, was to have been sent to the Maze to talk to the prisoners. That did not happen. Joe McDonnell died and the talks collapsed. There was suggestions at the time that Mr Alison had been overruled by Mrs Thatcher.

[Ah Well]

MI5 on Hunger Strike

March 19, 2009 · Print This Article

“There was absolutely no change in the government’s position.”

An unpublished interview with Sir John Blelloch, a member of MI5 who had been seconded to the NIO as a Deputy Secretary at the time of the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes, has come into the possession of the Bobby Sands Trust. The interview was conducted at the British Ministry of Defence in late September 1986 [where Blelloch was Permanent Under Secretary] by the author of ‘Biting At The Grave’, Padraig O’Malley, professor at the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

What is important about the interview is that it represents an insight into the psyche of the British at crucial periods in the hunger strikes, particularly at the time of mediation attempts by others, including the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace [ICJP].

O’Malley twice interviewed Blelloch: in September 1986 and again on 23rd November 1988. Below is an unedited extract from the September 1986 interview dealing with the death of IRA Volunteer Joe McDonnell, and is followed by Blelloch’s analysis of the first hunger strike. It is illuminating in that the interview was conducted long before the publication of ‘Ten Men Dead’, which reveals the republican analysis, and it shows the intransigence of the British government throughout both hunger strikes.

Padraig O’Malley [P.O’M]: On the second hunger strike, were there any differences, again the assumptions made, which influenced how policy was made?

John Blelloch [JB]: No, I don’t think so. I’m afraid, of course, that we all, I think, realised that the second hunger strike was more likely to lead to someone dying, particularly as we read, as I read, Sands’ personality. He, having been the leader the first time round, volunteered himself for the second. He did so in a way which left him personally very exposed if only because he went on first himself. I don’t think that was an accident. I think it’s very probable that Sands was determined to put himself in a position in which he did not have to take the decision that somebody else should die, which, of course, was the position that the leader of the first group was in. So, when the second strike was announced, I think most of us felt that Sands personally, and maybe some others, would go through with it, but the issues, I’m afraid, seemed to be what they were before. One response to the new situation was that we continued to be, I think, pretty generous in the facilities that we allowed for third parties to go in and see for themselves and talk to the prisoners and, as you’ve spoken to Michael Alison [Prisons Minister], no doubt he’s talked to you about the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace which I think was the last major effort by third parties to do something about this. But I think the issues were the same.

P.O’M: Let’s talk about that. In fact, if you wouldn’t mind, I might come back to see you again in November sometime because I’ll have this typed up and sent on to you in the meantime and it’ll allow me to get so far because there’ll be some ancillary questions that I’ll have. But that period, I think it was from the 3rd to the 11th of July when the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace…

JB: I’m sure you’ve got the dates right. I thought it was slightly earlier than that, I must say.

P.O’M: There was two rounds of meetings, I think. One was in late June…

JB: Well, I remember four meetings, I think, altogether. But, anyway, the facts can be established.

P.O’M: These were the meetings just before Joe McDonnell died and again I think it was a meeting on a Friday which extended well into a Saturday and then the Irish Commission when to the Maze, met with the prisoners and the relatives, came back and met with Mr Alison again and then, according to their version of events, again I think it was you, a senior civil servant, was to have been sent to the Maze to talk to the prisoners. That did not happen. Joe McDonnell died and the talks collapsed. There was suggestions at the time that Mr Alison had been overruled by Mrs Thatcher.

In fairness, that Thread title is a lil misleading ... something like "M15 re Hunger Strike" would have been more apt

[Mr Crowley]

Caught your attention though, didn't it