But you're assuming to know what the adherents of a particular religion consider insulting or abusive.
If I'm a Rastafarian, and I consider a description of cannabis as bad as insulting or abusive, as causing me outrage, then I merely have to attest to that.
How can it be proven that something published about cannabis wasn't, in fact, insulting or abusive, and didn't cause outrage to Rastafarians when Rastafarians testify that it was and did?
Perhaps a defendent in an initial case could argue successfully that they did not
intend to insult Rastafarianism by insulting or abusing the smoking of cannabis, a 'matter held sacred' to Rastafarians.
However, subsequent defendents could not rely on this defence, as the initial case would have made it clear that the future publication of material insulting or abusing the smoking of cannabis would, in fact and in law, cause outrage to Rastafarians. A person who published such claims after the initial case couldn't claim to be ignorant that insulting the smoking of cannabis was likely to cause outrage to Rastafarians. The way would be open to say that it was such common knowledge that Rastafarians were likely to be caused outrage by the publication of anything critical of smoking cannabis that any such publication was, in fact and in law, intended to cause outrage merely by being published, whatever the
stated intent of the publishers. After all,
intent in criminal law can be proven despite the statements of a defendent that a crime was not intended if there's sufficient other evidence so that intent may be inferred. For example, a person accused of attempted to commit burglary may claim that they did not intend to commit burglary by carrying tools typically carried by burglars. However "A jury may be permitted to infer criminal intent from facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that it existed. For example, the intent to commit [COLOR=#0000ff][COLOR=black]burglary[/COLOR][/COLOR]may be inferred from the accused's possession of tools for picking locks."
If I publish Danish-type cartoons but state that I didn't intend to cause outrage, then there may be sufficient evidence that a reasonable person should have known that the publication of these cartoons would, in fact and in law, cause outrage. Therefore, criminal intent, no matter what my
stated intent, can be inferred.
Likewise, if I publish cartoons which insult or abuse the smoking of cannabis by Rastafarians: criminal intent can be inferred.
The Supreme Court judgement in the Corway case made it clear that the Constitution does not permit the conferring of privilege or imposition of disability on one religion as compared to another.
All religions and all religious denominations, no matter what one might think of them, are held equal under the Constitution.
The idea that certain religions are 'recognised religion[s]' doesn't exist in the Irish Constitution: the article of the constitution which gave special recognition to the Catholic Church and which gave special protection to Judaism was removed in the early 1970s.
The Corway judgement makes clear that the state cannot privilege one religion or religious denomination over another. On that basis, Rastafarianism must be given the same constitutional and legal protections as Catholicism.