When I was a young and may I if I am not being too bold beautiful thing I hated the word queer. Now however just like black people who use the word nxxxer to describe a certain bolshie type of black person, queer is used by gay people to denote a gay person who is upfront and in your face. I just love being a queer.Originally Posted by White Horse
Is that not considered a term of abuse? Is it perfectly acceptable now to refer to a homosexual as a queer?
I wonder what would happen if someone took a case to challenge the way the Constitution makes mention of a womens place in the home etc.
It was written in a very different time and there is no reason at all why marriage has to be a man and woman.
Same sex couples should have exactly the same rights as married couples from tax and pensions to adoption and rights of inheritance. End of. And let those bigots who feel threatened by the sexuality of others go live with Irish Robinson in Pakistan.
Just as only freaks would argue a women is not capable of being a Dr or whatever - which was considered to be a fact not so long ago - it is perfectly reasonable to expect a countries Constitution - which is meant to be a living document - to evolve and change as a country evolves and changes.
Why should we have to live within the limits set by the frigid Queen Victoria just because she couldn't get her mind around some lady love. She died over 100 years ago. Get with the programme.
Where in the judgement of Dunne J. does it indicate that and in relation to what?The High Court decision suggested that no constitutional referendum would be required. Also, Goodwin.
"......... we must sometimes listen to those who, consumed with zeal, have scant judgment or balance. To such ones the modern world is nothing but betrayal and ruin.........We feel bound to disagree with these prophets of doom who are forever forecasting calamity -- as though the world's end were imminent."
Here, I think:
Dunne distinguishes between three categories of constitutional rights: explicit, implicit and unenumerated. Marriage is an implicit right, on her account. The court rejects the claim that it can, in itself, review the capacity to marry, but clearly does not deny that the Oireachtas can make amendments analogous to that of altering the age at which one may marry, without recourse to constitutional amendment. The rebuttal of the plaintiffs' claim about a changing consensus regarding the understanding of marriage relies on two pillars. One of those has been undermined by events in California (and the court had, I think, relied on now defunct Californian cases in replying to the plaintiffs). The second, and it seems to me more important, pillar is the opinion of the Oireachtas, as recently expressed. Between In re Marriage Cases, an expression by the Oireachtas in favour of an understanding of marriage that included same-sex couples, and the presumption of constitutionality that would attach to such an expression, there would be very little basis remaining in Dunne's opinion to dispute the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.I accept that the Constitution is a living instrument as referred to in the passage from the judgment of Walsh J. relied on by counsel for the plaintiffs but I also accept the arguments of Mr. O’Donnell to the effect that there is a difference between an examination of the Constitution in the context of ascertaining unenumerated rights and redefining a right which is implicit in the Constitution and which is clearly understood. In this case the court is being asked to redefine marriage to mean something which it has never done to date.
If I were to take the words used by Walsh J. in the McGee case, “No interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts”, one would have to ask the question on what basis is the court to interpret or ascertain the prevailing ideas and concepts. It is interesting to note that in the Sinnott case which was also relied on by the plaintiffs in this context, the Supreme Court held that the concept of primary education must be interpreted in the light of practice in 1937 but a majority of the court held that the word “child” in Article 42 must be understood as extending up to eighteen years, that is the present age of majority. If one was to transpose that reasoning to the facts of the present case one would say that one looks at the concept of marriage as it was defined in the light of practice or understanding in 1937 and that issues such as capacity must be understood in the light of prevailing law. So, for example, as was pointed out in the submissions of the plaintiffs it could not be argued that because the marriage age in 1937 was twelve for girls and fourteen for boys that a law which raised the age to eighteen years was unconstitutional on that account.
The right to marry contained in the Constitution is undoubtedly not an express right but is clearly implicit from the terms of Article 41. It is not a case where the court requires to ascertain a previously unenumerated right as the right to marry falls squarely within the terms of the Constitution. The definition of marriage to date has always been understood as being opposite sex marriage. How then can it be argued that in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts that definition be changed to encompass same sex marriage?
Having regard to the clear understanding of the meaning of marriage as set out in the numerous authorities opened to the Court from this jurisdiction and elsewhere, I do not see how marriage can be redefined by the Court to encompass same sex marriage. The Plaintiffs referred frequently in the course of this case to the “changing consensus” but I have to say the there is little evidence of that. The consensus around the world does not support a widespread move towards same sex marriage. There has been some limited support for the concept of same sex marriage as in Canada, Massachusetts and South Africa together with the three European countries previously referred to but, in truth, it is difficult to see that as a consensus, changing or otherwise.
In this jurisdiction, as recently as 2004, s. 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act was enacted. That Act sets out what was previously the common law exclusion of same sex couples from the institution of marriage. Is that not of itself an indication of the prevailing idea and concept in relation to what marriage is and how it should be defined? I think it is.
One of the curious aspects of this case is that the provision referred to in the Civil Registration Act 2004, has not been directly impugned or challenged in these proceedings. I know that that has been explained by counsel for the plaintiffs on the basis that the Act did not come into force until 5th December 2005. Nonetheless the Act is in force, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and is to my mind an expression of the prevailing view as to the basis for capacity to marry. I find it extremely difficult to comprehend how an assertion of a constitutional right to marry in these proceedings could incidentally have the effect of rendering unconstitutional an Act passed by the Oireachtas as recently as 2004. If the plaintiffs had brought a challenge to the constitutionality of that Act, of course it would have been necessary for them to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. The plaintiffs have not sought to do so.
I am none too sure that that would, indeed, be the view of the Supreme Court. What you are suggesting is that the Oireachtas, by an Act, can redefine an implicit constitutionally understood right. Your analogy re capacity to marry surely cannot stand up. The Constitution holds that there is an implicit right to marry but the oireachtas regulates the capacity to do so. It does not seek to abolish or circumvent such a right, but to order it in the public interest/good. Nor does the Oireachtas seek to redefine marriage, which is what you suggest it do. That, surely, would not be constitutionally premissable.Here, I think:
Dunne distinguishes between three categories of constitutional rights: explicit, implicit and unenumerated. Marriage is an implicit right, on her account. The court rejects the claim that it can, in itself, review the capacity to marry, but clearly does not deny that the Oireachtas can make amendments analogous to that of altering the age at which one may marry, without recourse to constitutional amendment. The rebuttal of the plaintiffs' claim about a changing consensus regarding the understanding of marriage relies on two pillars. One of those has been undermined by events in California (and the court had, I think, relied on now defunct Californian cases in replying to the plaintiffs). The second, and it seems to me more important, pillar is the opinion of the Oireachtas, as recently expressed. Between In re Marriage Cases, an expression by the Oireachtas in favour of an understanding of marriage that included same-sex couples, and the presumption of constitutionality that would attach to such an expression, there would be very little basis remaining in Dunne's opinion to dispute the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.I accept that the Constitution is a living instrument as referred to in the passage from the judgment of Walsh J. relied on by counsel for the plaintiffs but I also accept the arguments of Mr. O’Donnell to the effect that there is a difference between an examination of the Constitution in the context of ascertaining unenumerated rights and redefining a right which is implicit in the Constitution and which is clearly understood. In this case the court is being asked to redefine marriage to mean something which it has never done to date.
If I were to take the words used by Walsh J. in the McGee case, “No interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts”, one would have to ask the question on what basis is the court to interpret or ascertain the prevailing ideas and concepts. It is interesting to note that in the Sinnott case which was also relied on by the plaintiffs in this context, the Supreme Court held that the concept of primary education must be interpreted in the light of practice in 1937 but a majority of the court held that the word “child” in Article 42 must be understood as extending up to eighteen years, that is the present age of majority. If one was to transpose that reasoning to the facts of the present case one would say that one looks at the concept of marriage as it was defined in the light of practice or understanding in 1937 and that issues such as capacity must be understood in the light of prevailing law. So, for example, as was pointed out in the submissions of the plaintiffs it could not be argued that because the marriage age in 1937 was twelve for girls and fourteen for boys that a law which raised the age to eighteen years was unconstitutional on that account.
The right to marry contained in the Constitution is undoubtedly not an express right but is clearly implicit from the terms of Article 41. It is not a case where the court requires to ascertain a previously unenumerated right as the right to marry falls squarely within the terms of the Constitution. The definition of marriage to date has always been understood as being opposite sex marriage. How then can it be argued that in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts that definition be changed to encompass same sex marriage?
Having regard to the clear understanding of the meaning of marriage as set out in the numerous authorities opened to the Court from this jurisdiction and elsewhere, I do not see how marriage can be redefined by the Court to encompass same sex marriage. The Plaintiffs referred frequently in the course of this case to the “changing consensus” but I have to say the there is little evidence of that. The consensus around the world does not support a widespread move towards same sex marriage. There has been some limited support for the concept of same sex marriage as in Canada, Massachusetts and South Africa together with the three European countries previously referred to but, in truth, it is difficult to see that as a consensus, changing or otherwise.
In this jurisdiction, as recently as 2004, s. 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act was enacted. That Act sets out what was previously the common law exclusion of same sex couples from the institution of marriage. Is that not of itself an indication of the prevailing idea and concept in relation to what marriage is and how it should be defined? I think it is.
One of the curious aspects of this case is that the provision referred to in the Civil Registration Act 2004, has not been directly impugned or challenged in these proceedings. I know that that has been explained by counsel for the plaintiffs on the basis that the Act did not come into force until 5th December 2005. Nonetheless the Act is in force, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and is to my mind an expression of the prevailing view as to the basis for capacity to marry. I find it extremely difficult to comprehend how an assertion of a constitutional right to marry in these proceedings could incidentally have the effect of rendering unconstitutional an Act passed by the Oireachtas as recently as 2004. If the plaintiffs had brought a challenge to the constitutionality of that Act, of course it would have been necessary for them to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. The plaintiffs have not sought to do so.
"......... we must sometimes listen to those who, consumed with zeal, have scant judgment or balance. To such ones the modern world is nothing but betrayal and ruin.........We feel bound to disagree with these prophets of doom who are forever forecasting calamity -- as though the world's end were imminent."
Ok a fair point (even if I had to read it 3 times to get it).
But that was then, this is now. That argument might have worked had the political parties (barring SF who opposed and Labour - who abstained) not amended s. 2(2)(e).They did. So that is the current expression of implicit right. Then had a couple - who fulfilled all the other criteria - tried to marry under Irish law (as opposed to Canadian) and were refused they could have invoked that as an argument and it could have found favour in the High Court. There are too many coulds there.
The sitaution we are now in, is the key sentence is:
While I appreciate that your argument rests on the underlined portion, I would not have great confidence in the Supreme Court running with it (mind you I never thought that they would issue a warrant for the re-arrest of someone when the act under which they were sentenced had been declared unconstitutional).Having regard to the clear understanding of the meaning of marriage as set out in the numerous authorities opened to the Court from this jurisdiction and elsewhere, I do not see how marriage can be redefined by the Court to encompass same sex marriage.
There may be a (slow) race to see which comes first: Civil Partnership or the decision in the appeal in Zappone. Does anyone have timeframe for either?
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don't know we don't know.
In raising the age at which a person can marry, the Oireachtas restricted the right of some people to marry - it actually removed the right from some people who had previously had it, and it did so without the need for a constitutional amendment. I would suggest that extending a constitutional right would raise fewer constitutional issues than restricting or removing one, and if the Oireachtas has the power to do the latter, then it may also do the former, but that's not an essential point. The Oireachtas clearly can define the scope of marriage, and has done so in altering the minimum age at which people can marry. Is that redefining marriage? You would say it isn't. But equally, I will go on to say that allowing same-sex couples to marry isn't redefining marriage, it is simply altering the scope of marriage.
What I think this question may come down to is whether one sees the 'opposite sex' requirement as a 'core' part of the understanding of marriage, or as a restriction of the capacity to enter a marriage. Consider two other requirements - the age requirement and the consanguinity requirement. If I go to another country, where 16-year-olds can marry, and come across a married couple in which both parties are 16 years old, I have no difficulty understanding their relationship as a marriage. Equally, if a brother and sister are married in some religious ceremony, have sex with one another, live together, have and raise children together, and grow old together, I may think that there is something deeply wrong about those facts, but I have no difficulty understanding their relationship as a marriage. I might say that brothers and sisters should not be allowed to marry, but the fact that I can make that claim suggests that the claim that they could marry is perfectly intelligible to me.
By contrast, consider a man who 'marries' a woman in a coma. There can be no conceivable marriage here, because, as far as I am concerned, informed consent is part of the core definition of marriage. It's not simply that I think a forced marriage would be wrong, it's that it couldn't be a marriage at all. Now, some people take this approach to same-sex marriage, which simply goes to show that there is no consensus as to the core concept of a marriage. I have absolutely no difficulty conceiving of two people of the same sex as being married.
Well, the claim is that the Oireachtas could, as soon as it next convenes, pass a bill allowing same-sex marriage, and that such an act would be constitutional (and would change the current expression of the relevant implicit right). The impact on the Zappone case itself is not really relevant to that claim.
I think there's an issue with respect to the timing, but I would have thought that it has more to do with the ECHR implications of the case than with the implications under Irish law (since the existence of civil partnerships has been held to ameliorate possible breaches of the Convention).
Surely any gay person who is happy to settle for civil partnership rather than marriage does not believe in equality. I think they should be allowed get wed
I think you shouldn't be allowed out alone.
What has equality got to do with anything? We are all equal. We are all entitled to marry someone from the opposite sex. However, all relationships are NOT equal. Homosexual relationships are massively inferior and should not be valued the same as heterosexual relationships by society.
Does the zoophile who is in love with his donkey suffer inequality because their relationship is considered inferior (and indeed illegal) by society?
People should not have a right to marry someone of the same sex, their cat, their sister, their cousin, or a tin of beans.
Everytime we as a society conceed an inch to deviants of any kind we kill a little bit more of our society.
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