Was the Allies "Dehousing" objective in WW2 the best use of military resources?

[Dylan2010]

It probably should have been called the Delife-ing policy however leaving aside the moral issue as I’m sure its been done to death, just in strictly military terms was it the best use of resources? A spitfire cost roughly £12K and a Lancaster bomber cost nearly £50K so we are talking a 4:1 ratio in cost of a bomber versus a fighter.

The argument that’s put forward most is that it tied up German resources trying to defend against the attacks. However given that bombers have no effect on the battlefield, was everything from the battle of Britain to the North African campaign made more difficult as there were less fighters or fighter bombers which would have had a direct effect on battles and in disrupting supplies to front lines. Also note that a Sherman Tank cost roughly £6-7K , so you could have 7 tanks for the price of a bomber.

[Nebuchadnezzar]

It probably should have been called the Delife-ing policy however leaving aside the moral issue as I’m sure its been done to death, just in strictly military terms was it the best use of resources? A spitfire cost roughly £12K and a Lancaster bomber cost nearly £50K so we are talking a 4:1 ratio in cost of a bomber versus a fighter.

The argument that’s put forward most is that it tied up German resources trying to defend against the attacks. However given that bombers have no effect on the battlefield, was everything from the battle of Britain to the North African campaign made more difficult as there were less fighters or fighter bombers which would have had a direct effect on battles and in disrupting supplies to front lines. Also note that a Sherman Tank cost roughly £6-7K , so you could have 7 tanks for the price of a bomber.

I dont think you can seperate the moral question from the consideration of its effectiveness - if it was effective as the best use of resources in winning the war then it could be argued that it was moral in spite of its horrors. However the conduct of the bombing campaign, particularly by the British, and the policy of area bombing of urban centres was not efficient. If the choice of targets had been focussed on oil refineries, and transportation hubs it would have been much more effective. The policy was framed by the air power theories of the 1930's, the british failed to learn the limitations of mass bombing from the Blitz and persevered with it inspite of increasing evidence of its inefficiency until the very end of the war.

[markjbloggs]

the british failed to learn the limitations of mass bombing from the Blitz and persevered with it inspite of increasing evidence of its inefficiency until the very end of the war.

Not sure about that. Much of the thought process that went into the bombing campaign came about as a result of the destruction of Coventry and the effect that bombing had on the administration of that city. The destruction of offices, transport links and "officialdom" were noted in that city and this was seen as a primary justification for the raids on Germany.

[Nebuchadnezzar]

Not sure about that. Much of the thought process that went into the bombing campaign came about as a result of the destruction of Coventry and the effect that bombing had on the administration of that city. The destruction of offices, transport links and "officialdom" were noted in that city and this was seen as a primary justification for the raids on Germany.

The advocates of area bombing in the 20s/30s foresaw it as the means of conducting 'new war' which would rapidly and decisively end conflict. The rationale behind it was based on the effect of terror causing mass panic and civic collapse. The German bombing of UK 40/41 provided plenty of evidence as to its relative lack of effectiveness. However whilst the Americans went on to focus on daylight 'precision' bombing, the British (perhaps believing in the superior resilience of the British public) came to the conclusion that the German failure was due to lack of scale.

The British industrial capacity devoted to the bombing campaign was equal to that taken up by the British Army. Was this input valid given its results? Once the policy decision had been taken back in 1941 it would undoubtedly have been awkward to make a major change in direction but was it morally valid to continue? Was it an efficient way to win the war? I do not believe so.

[Dylan2010]

I dont think you can seperate the moral question from the consideration of its effectiveness - if it was effective as the best use of resources in winning the war then it could be argued that it was moral in spite of its horrors. However the conduct of the bombing campaign, particularly by the British, and the policy of area bombing of urban centres was not efficient. If the choice of targets had been focussed on oil refineries, and transportation hubs it would have been much more effective. The policy was framed by the air power theories of the 1930's, the british failed to learn the limitations of mass bombing from the Blitz and persevered with it inspite of increasing evidence of its inefficiency until the very end of the war.

I think Barnes Wallis had put some ideas forward about focusing on their oil facilities. I agree you cant seperate the moral dimension, but the historical narrative is that it was effective, but compared to what is my question? I'd agree that it tied up a massive amounts of allied resources that could have been deployed to the field directly with none of the moral questions hanging over it.

[Nebuchadnezzar]

I think Barnes Wallis had put some ideas forward about focusing on their oil facilities. I agree you cant seperate the moral dimension, but the historical narrative is that it was effective, but compared to what is my question? I'd agree that it tied up a massive amounts of allied resources that could have been deployed to the field directly with none of the moral questions hanging over it.

One aspect of the bombing campaign which rarely gets any mention is the aerial mining of the river Danube between April and Sept 1944. Liberators and Wellingtons based in Italy effectively shut down the waterway and caused major problems for german transportation of oil from the romanian fields, also large quantities of ammunition bound for the Eastern Front were stranded onboard imobile barges or stuck in the overloaded rail network. German counter-measures were not effective due to a lack of sweeping equipment and the difficulty of defending a non focal target. And the cost to the Allies for this obscure success? 11 aircraft.

Post mission assessments caused Churchill to remark to Portal - "You are on to a good thing". It is tragic that similar operations had not been carried out on a widespread basis much earlier in the war - a sustained campaign against the Rhine would have been a much better use of resouces than the "Dehousing" of Koln.

[Dylan2010]

One aspect of the bombing campaign which rarely gets any mention is the aerial mining of the river Danube between April and Sept 1944. Liberators and Wellingtons based in Italy effectively shut down the waterway and caused major problems for german transportation of oil from the romanian fields, also large quantities of ammunition bound for the Eastern Front were stranded onboard imobile barges or stuck in the overloaded rail network. German counter-measures were not effective due to a lack of sweeping equipment and the difficulty of defending a non focal target. And the cost to the Allies for this obscure success? 11 aircraft.

Post mission assessments caused Churchill to remark to Portal - "You are on to a good thing". It is tragic that similar operations had not been carried out on a widespread basis much earlier in the war - a sustained campaign against the Rhine would have been a much better use of resouces than the "Dehousing" of Koln.

excellent point, I cant think of the example now, but there were examples of either rare alloys or additives that a break in supply would stop production of aircraft for instance, the allies did target some of these but it was never the focus of the effort. my conclusion, some months were added to the war due to the Harris strategy and bomber command in general.

[Nebuchadnezzar]

excellent point, I cant think of the example now, but there were examples of either rare alloys or additives that a break in supply would stop production of aircraft for instance, the allies did target some of these but it was never the focus of the effort. my conclusion, some months were added to the war due to the Harris strategy and bomber command in general.

Were they perhaps nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum used in the Jumo 004 jet engine? I know the germans were very short in these materials but I wasnt aware of any specific Allied targeting.

[BlueNovember]

Were they perhaps nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum used in the Jumo 004 jet engine? I know the germans were very short in these materials but I wasnt aware of any specific Allied targeting.

I think that it may have been chromium? I think the British grabbed the Turkish supplies of it at the outset of the war,which necessitated the Germans to come up with an a partially effective for jet engines. I wouldn't put the house on it,though.

[Luachara]

It probably should have been called the Delife-ing policy however leaving aside the moral issue as I’m sure its been done to death, just in strictly military terms was it the best use of resources? A spitfire cost roughly £12K and a Lancaster bomber cost nearly £50K so we are talking a 4:1 ratio in cost of a bomber versus a fighter.

The argument that’s put forward most is that it tied up German resources trying to defend against the attacks. However given that bombers have no effect on the battlefield, was everything from the battle of Britain to the North African campaign made more difficult as there were less fighters or fighter bombers which would have had a direct effect on battles and in disrupting supplies to front lines. Also note that a Sherman Tank cost roughly £6-7K , so you could have 7 tanks for the price of a bomber.

The Air War on Germany tied down almost 3 million German troops and tens of thousands of anti aircraft guns that were kept out of the front lines. Mush of the output of explosives manufacture was consubed by antiaircraft fire. In addition German production was effected and reduced their output substantially. Even disrupting the sleep of the Germans impacted production and morale.

The 20th Century saw the evolution of total war which was war against the civilian population. In medevial times civilians got the option of leaving a besieged city before the siege commenced. If they refused they were subject to slaughter on capture of the city. The modern bombing war is merely an extension fo the Laws of War.