I'm only telling you what Operation Green states, chimp.
Read it again and try to concentrate on d'underlined bits, ok?
""..
a landing in Ireland can be attempted only if Ireland requests help. For the present our envoy [assumed to be Dr. Eduard Hempel of the German Legation]
must ascertain whether De Valera desires support and whether he wishes to have his military equipment supplemented by captured British war material (guns and ammunition), which could be sent to him in independent ships. Ireland is important to the Commander in Chief, Air, [Göring] as his base for attacks on the north-west ports of Britain, although weather conditions must be investigated. The occupation of Ireland might lead to the end of the war"
"
The estimation of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder of the Naval High Command was lukewarm, just as it had been for Sea Lion.[8] His concern was German naval strength and resupply of any landed troops:
"To a defending force, cut off and left to its own devices, the topography of the country [Ireland] does not afford us much protection... without supplies and reinforcements they would soon feel the increasing pressure of British expeditionary force brought over under the protection of British naval power;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...Ireland)sooner or later our own troops would face a situation similar to Namsos or Dunkirk."[9]
In this sense Green can be seen as a worst case scenario for the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). While Kaupitsch was to continue planning and training for Sea Lion/Green he seems to have shelved preparations in late 1940 and not returned to them.
From his point of view Green had become a feint. This view is reinforced by examining one of the warnings offered to participating German forces in the plan"
Operation Green (Ireland) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
You and your mendacious ways
