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  1. #51
    yobosayo yobosayo is offline
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    From a piece on Feldgrau.com:

    How significant was the American contribution to the Soviet war effort of WW2? Let us look at the Soviet car manufacturing industry of the pre-war era as but one example. The following table might help to place some U.S. contributions into a more optimal perspective:

    AMO vehicles - Moscow plant - assistance through Brandt.
    GAZ vehicles - Molotov Nr. 1, Gorky plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
    GAZ vehicles - Nizhni-Novgorod plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
    YAZ vehicles - Yaroslav plant - assistance through Hercules.
    ZIS vehicles - Kuznetsk plant - assistance through Autocar and Brandt.

    On 31 May 1929, Henry Ford and the Ford Corporation signed a contract allowing the Soviet Union to construct GAZ-A cars and GAZ-AA trucks at the Nizhni-Novgorod plant. U.S. engineers directed the construction of the factory and Ford provided most of the tools and jigs. Soviet engineers were sent to Ford’s Rogue River plant near Detroit to study U.S. automotive engineering methodologies (Ford basically told the Soviets the economics behind mass production techniques, American style). The Austin Company, Cleveland, OH, provided the Soviets with assistance for the construction of the AMO-3 two and a half ton trucks.

    The ZIS-5 and ZIS-6 trucks were copies of the U.S. Autocar trucks. Holley carburetors (Holley Carburetors Co., Detroit, MI) were built at the Samara carburetor and motor plant after 1932. The Yaroslav tire plant was patterned after the Seiberling tire plant in Akron, OH. Of interest is that 34% of all trucks manufactured by the Soviet Union during the war were made at the Molotov Nr. 1 plant in Gorky; the GAZ-M trucks produced there being a direct copy of the 1934 Ford truck.

    Because of the United States and all of the economic help it (and Germany to a lesser extent) provided to the Soviet Union during the 1930’s, the Soviet Union essentially advanced technologically 50 years in only an eight to 10 year span. When the U.S. engineers and specialists were forced to leave in the late 1930’s (some were never allowed to leave the Soviet Union despite the fact they were U.S. citizens), the Soviets were really only left with one realistic economic option - continue to utilize the basic systems and the mass production methodologies the Americans had left behind. And that is what they did during the Second World War. They were understandably crude copies of their American counterparts, but never-the-less, they were effective copies.

    The Germans were not able to copy the American production methodologies; though they clearly analyzed and studied them very extensively. German factories were not designed for “mass” mass production. The American and the German economies of scale were so much different. In addition, the Allied air war forced the Germans to increasingly scale down the size of all of their production facilities and disperse them to prevent them from being bombed. By 1942/1943, just when the Germans needed it most, it was no longer possible for them to produce “one item” from start to finish under one roof.

    ***
    The Allied lend-lease aid effort was truly a monumental undertaking. During the course of the Second World War, the Western Allies sent 811 ships to Soviet ports filled with lend-lease aid. The Germans sank 58 of those ships. 33 of the 811 ships returned to port (mechanical breakdowns; damaged by a German attack, but able to proceed under their own power; etc.).

    Murmansk and Vladivostok were among the most utilized ports. The route over the Pacific was safer, but it also took longer. Allied convoys had to first cross the Pacific, then the lend-lease aid goods had to traverse Siberia via train. Initially, Iran was hardly used as a trans-shipment route. The existing infrastructure needed to transport lend-lease goods to the Soviet Union was not optimal. After 1943, when the Allies developed better transportation networks in Iran and the Middle East in general, the Persian route became a more critical link. Of all the lend-lease aid, approximately 50% was delivered via the Pacific, 25% via Persia and 25% via the northern route to Archangel and Murmansk.

    If the Allies were not well prepared to initiate lend-lease support to the Soviet Union in 1941, so was the Soviet Union not in an optimal position to accept the aid. Interestingly, in August of 1941, the heaviest crane at Murmansk could only lift an 11-ton load. The British had to quickly supply the Soviets with a heavier crane to help speed up the lend-lease off-loading efforts. The RAF also provided aerial support to protect Murmansk from the Luftwaffe. With VVS approval, the 151st RAF Wing arrived at their new base in Vaenga (about 20 miles out of Murmansk) in August of 1941 with 24 Hurricanes (15 additional Hurricane a/c were shipped in crates to Vaenga).

    The first PQ’s arrived safely in the Soviet Union with their precious freight. But the Germans reacted quickly by sending both Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe units against the new threat. The first major loss was inflicted on PQ-13 in March of 1942 (PQ-13 lost five ships). PQ-14 and PQ15 also took heavy losses. Churchill wanted to increase the spacing between the departing convoys as a measure to offset losses. The Royal Navy wanted to stop all lend-lease aid during the summer months. The sun was out nearly 24 hours a day in the far northern Arctic waters and this would make any ship easy pickings for the Germans. For political reasons, the British could not select either option. The convoy schedule had to continue. PQ-16 was given a heavier escort and was increased in size to 35 merchantmen. The Germans sunk seven merchantmen and damaged one in PQ-16. PQ-17 was delayed in departing because the RN had to first protect its convoys going to Malta - it did not have enough escort vessels to go around. The U.S.Navy also could not provide escort assistance at that time because the USN was engaged in escorting U.S. merchantmen off of U.S. waters. PQ-17 sailed in June of 1942; it was a disaster for the Allies. The Germans sank 23 of the 36 ships. PQ-18, which departed on 02 September 1942, lost 13 out of 40 ships.

    Here is an example of PQ convoy. In January of 1944, an American lend-lease convoy left Seattle bound for Vladivostok. Its manifest read as follows:

    46 merchantmen (all 8-10K ton ships); built by McCormack Ship Yards; Soviet flagged (to avoid being torpedoed by the Japanese who could attack U.S. flagged vessels but who could not attack Soviet flagged ones) and Soviet crewed.

    Six of the 46 ships were loaded with ammunitions and small arms. Four of the 46 ships were loaded with foodstuffs. Two of the 46 ships were loaded by Dodge (presumably with trucks). One ship was loaded by Westinghouse (presumably with communications gear).

    They carried:

    22.000 tons of steel provided by U.S. Steel.
    3.000 truck chassis, by Ford (the Soviets also assembled U.S. trucks from parts).
    3.000 truck differentials from Thornton Tandem Co.
    2.000 tractors by Allis Chalmers Co. (agricultural and military use)
    1.500 automotive batteries from the Price Battery Corp.
    1.000 aircraft provided by the North American Aviation Co.
    612 airplanes from the Douglas Aircraft Co.
    600 trucks from Mack.
    500 Allison aircraft engines.
    500 half-tracks from Minneapolis Moline Co.
    400 airplanes from Bell Aircraft
    400 electric motors from Wagner Electric Co.
    400 truck chassis by GM (see Ford above)
    310 tons of ball bearings from the Fafnir Company.
    200 aircraft provided by the U.S. Navy
    200 aircraft engines by Aeromarine
    100 tractor-trailer units by GM (trucks)
    70 aircraft engines by Pratt & Whitney

    In the end, Ultra and more dedicated Allied naval efforts helped to secure the northern lend-lease routes from German attacks. The Kriegsmarine lost a number of heavy ships for their efforts as well.

    The following table, not an inclusive one by any means, shows the extent of lend-lease aid the Western Allies provided to the Soviet Union from 01 October 1941 to 31 March 1946 (not a typo, aid went on well after WWII ended). CW - Commonwealth contribution; US - American contribution:

    Aircraft - 7.411 (CW) + 14.795 (US) = 22.206
    Automotive:
    --- 1.5 ton trucks 151.053 (US)
    --- 2.5 ton trucks 200.662 (US)
    --- Willys Jeeps 77.972 (US)
    Bren Gun Carriers - 2.560 (CW)
    Boots - 15 million pairs (US)
    Communications equipment:
    --- Field phones - 380.135 (US)
    --- Radios - 40.000 (US)
    --- Telephone cable - 1.25 million miles (US)
    Cotton cloth - 107 million square yards (US)
    Foodstuffs - 4.5 million tons (US)
    Leather - 49.000 tons (US)
    Motorcycles - 35.170 (US)
    Locomotives - 1.981 units (US)
    Rolling stock - 11.155 units (US)
    Tanks - 5.218 (CW) + 7.537 (US) = 12.755
    Tractors - 8.701 (US)
    Trucks - 4.020 (CW) + 357.883 (US) = 361.903

    In the early 1930’s the U.S. helped lay the foundations for a formidable Soviet truck production capability. During the war, Soviet production efforts were augmented through lend-lease aid. In terms of truck usage, U.S. lend-lease trucks generally went directly to front line combat units. Soviet built trucks were generally used in rear areas. Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, Studebaker, etc., all could be found on the eastern front. The Soviet Union ended the Second World War by having over 650.000 trucks available for use. Of those, 58% were Soviet in origin, 33% British or U.S. and the remaining percentage captured from the Germans.

    U.S. lend-lease food supplies were sufficient to supply 6 million Soviet soldiers with one pound of (quality) consumables for each day of the war. Also, U.S. food supplies, such as canned Spam, had a seemingly indefinite shelf-life and could be stored anywhere without spoilage when compared to one of the standard Soviet military staple diets, dried fish (consuming dried fish causes one to drink more - this in turn increases the number of "breaks" one has to take - and that is not a desirable condition if one is close proximity to enemy lines).

    Lend-lease aid amounted to approximately 10-12% of the total Soviet war production effort. While this does not seem like a significant amount, having 10% more key supplies available could make the difference between holding the line to going on the offensive.


    The 10-12% is in actual materials. Consider again the beginning of the material, with the likes of Henry Ford teaching them how to mass mass produce (helped them make their own in mass quantities). And note the Spam. Spam won the war (since as Napolean so aptly said, an army travels on its stomach):

    Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II (Book Review)

    Lastly, well and truly, from a comment to that piece by an Albert:

    As the book points out. All of Russians first-class aviation gasoline was supplied by the USA. A great deal of food was american. Their boots, most of the uniform material was as well. Plus rubber for the their tires, all their aluminum, fully 1/3 of their munitions, over 500,000 trucks which were all far better than any Russian produced during the war (about 200,000). The 9000 or so tanks supplied by the allies were a small amount but helped. Upgunned (76mm) Shermans were a big part of the Russian drive through the Balkans, where hundreds of them participatedm and had a measure of success. Aerocobras, P40s, C-47 and A-20's (18000+) all considerably assisted the Russian war effort. Almost all telephone communication was over american phones late in the war. The Russians produced 92 locomotives during the war. They got 2000 through lend-lease. The numbers go on and on, but a picture of the value of lend-lease should start making itself clear.

    The western allies had far more than a marginal role in defeating the Germans. This role was to tie down the majority of manufactured items being in the west and not in the east.

    Well over half the luftwaffe was engaged in the west from 1942-45, and 75% of german aircraft casualties were against the Western Allies. each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. The Germans built over 1000. A panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 german tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war of the atlantic. Think 40,000 panthers might have made a difference on the eastern front? Each V2 rocket cost in labor and material, the same as 3.5 fighter planes. The germans launched over 3000 V2's. Do the math on that.

    The British and Americans deployed over 20,000 heavy bombers against the Germans, suffering horrendous casaulites, and also doling out great destruction. The Russians never developed one.

    There were also 10000 heavy caliber anti-aircraft guns defending the reich. Do you think those would have shored up German defenses in the east?

    What would have happend if Rommel's Africa corps and the 30+ german divisions in France would have been in the don bend in the fall of 1942 protecting Stalingrad, instead of waiting for the British and Americans to land? What would have happed if the 400,000 good troops station in Norway could have helped Army Group North capture Leningrad? What would have happened if the 30+ divisions fighting in Italy and the Balkans for the Germans could have been freed to fight against the Russians in the south? What would have happed if in 1944, the german armies trying to hold the Allies out of France would have been sent to BelaRussia in prior to Bagraton?

    The Germans were never really able to muster much more than half their real strength against the Ruissias. They were fighting a technological war against the brits and americans that required a huge effort from a manufacturing standpoint to counter. Russians give the allies no credit for tying down so many German resources and destroying so many others (30% of total production in 1944) with their strategic bombing campaign.

    I suppose if I lost 25 million peple in the war, I might feel the same way. But that would be ignoring the real facts regarding the relative contribution of the Western Allies in the defeat of the German nation.
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  2. #52
    owedtojoy owedtojoy is offline
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    Quote Originally Posted by yobosayo View Post
    From a piece on Feldgrau.com:

    How significant was the American contribution to the Soviet war effort of WW2? Let us look at the Soviet car manufacturing industry of the pre-war era as but one example. The following table might help to place some U.S. contributions into a more optimal perspective:

    AMO vehicles - Moscow plant - assistance through Brandt.
    GAZ vehicles - Molotov Nr. 1, Gorky plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
    GAZ vehicles - Nizhni-Novgorod plant - assistance through Austin and Ford.
    YAZ vehicles - Yaroslav plant - assistance through Hercules.
    ZIS vehicles - Kuznetsk plant - assistance through Autocar and Brandt.

    On 31 May 1929, Henry Ford and the Ford Corporation signed a contract allowing the Soviet Union to construct GAZ-A cars and GAZ-AA trucks at the Nizhni-Novgorod plant. U.S. engineers directed the construction of the factory and Ford provided most of the tools and jigs. Soviet engineers were sent to Ford’s Rogue River plant near Detroit to study U.S. automotive engineering methodologies (Ford basically told the Soviets the economics behind mass production techniques, American style). The Austin Company, Cleveland, OH, provided the Soviets with assistance for the construction of the AMO-3 two and a half ton trucks.

    The ZIS-5 and ZIS-6 trucks were copies of the U.S. Autocar trucks. Holley carburetors (Holley Carburetors Co., Detroit, MI) were built at the Samara carburetor and motor plant after 1932. The Yaroslav tire plant was patterned after the Seiberling tire plant in Akron, OH. Of interest is that 34% of all trucks manufactured by the Soviet Union during the war were made at the Molotov Nr. 1 plant in Gorky; the GAZ-M trucks produced there being a direct copy of the 1934 Ford truck.

    Because of the United States and all of the economic help it (and Germany to a lesser extent) provided to the Soviet Union during the 1930’s, the Soviet Union essentially advanced technologically 50 years in only an eight to 10 year span. When the U.S. engineers and specialists were forced to leave in the late 1930’s (some were never allowed to leave the Soviet Union despite the fact they were U.S. citizens), the Soviets were really only left with one realistic economic option - continue to utilize the basic systems and the mass production methodologies the Americans had left behind. And that is what they did during the Second World War. They were understandably crude copies of their American counterparts, but never-the-less, they were effective copies.

    The Germans were not able to copy the American production methodologies; though they clearly analyzed and studied them very extensively. German factories were not designed for “mass” mass production. The American and the German economies of scale were so much different. In addition, the Allied air war forced the Germans to increasingly scale down the size of all of their production facilities and disperse them to prevent them from being bombed. By 1942/1943, just when the Germans needed it most, it was no longer possible for them to produce “one item” from start to finish under one roof.

    ***
    The Allied lend-lease aid effort was truly a monumental undertaking. During the course of the Second World War, the Western Allies sent 811 ships to Soviet ports filled with lend-lease aid. The Germans sank 58 of those ships. 33 of the 811 ships returned to port (mechanical breakdowns; damaged by a German attack, but able to proceed under their own power; etc.).

    Murmansk and Vladivostok were among the most utilized ports. The route over the Pacific was safer, but it also took longer. Allied convoys had to first cross the Pacific, then the lend-lease aid goods had to traverse Siberia via train. Initially, Iran was hardly used as a trans-shipment route. The existing infrastructure needed to transport lend-lease goods to the Soviet Union was not optimal. After 1943, when the Allies developed better transportation networks in Iran and the Middle East in general, the Persian route became a more critical link. Of all the lend-lease aid, approximately 50% was delivered via the Pacific, 25% via Persia and 25% via the northern route to Archangel and Murmansk.

    If the Allies were not well prepared to initiate lend-lease support to the Soviet Union in 1941, so was the Soviet Union not in an optimal position to accept the aid. Interestingly, in August of 1941, the heaviest crane at Murmansk could only lift an 11-ton load. The British had to quickly supply the Soviets with a heavier crane to help speed up the lend-lease off-loading efforts. The RAF also provided aerial support to protect Murmansk from the Luftwaffe. With VVS approval, the 151st RAF Wing arrived at their new base in Vaenga (about 20 miles out of Murmansk) in August of 1941 with 24 Hurricanes (15 additional Hurricane a/c were shipped in crates to Vaenga).

    The first PQ’s arrived safely in the Soviet Union with their precious freight. But the Germans reacted quickly by sending both Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe units against the new threat. The first major loss was inflicted on PQ-13 in March of 1942 (PQ-13 lost five ships). PQ-14 and PQ15 also took heavy losses. Churchill wanted to increase the spacing between the departing convoys as a measure to offset losses. The Royal Navy wanted to stop all lend-lease aid during the summer months. The sun was out nearly 24 hours a day in the far northern Arctic waters and this would make any ship easy pickings for the Germans. For political reasons, the British could not select either option. The convoy schedule had to continue. PQ-16 was given a heavier escort and was increased in size to 35 merchantmen. The Germans sunk seven merchantmen and damaged one in PQ-16. PQ-17 was delayed in departing because the RN had to first protect its convoys going to Malta - it did not have enough escort vessels to go around. The U.S.Navy also could not provide escort assistance at that time because the USN was engaged in escorting U.S. merchantmen off of U.S. waters. PQ-17 sailed in June of 1942; it was a disaster for the Allies. The Germans sank 23 of the 36 ships. PQ-18, which departed on 02 September 1942, lost 13 out of 40 ships.

    Here is an example of PQ convoy. In January of 1944, an American lend-lease convoy left Seattle bound for Vladivostok. Its manifest read as follows:

    46 merchantmen (all 8-10K ton ships); built by McCormack Ship Yards; Soviet flagged (to avoid being torpedoed by the Japanese who could attack U.S. flagged vessels but who could not attack Soviet flagged ones) and Soviet crewed.

    Six of the 46 ships were loaded with ammunitions and small arms. Four of the 46 ships were loaded with foodstuffs. Two of the 46 ships were loaded by Dodge (presumably with trucks). One ship was loaded by Westinghouse (presumably with communications gear).

    They carried:

    22.000 tons of steel provided by U.S. Steel.
    3.000 truck chassis, by Ford (the Soviets also assembled U.S. trucks from parts).
    3.000 truck differentials from Thornton Tandem Co.
    2.000 tractors by Allis Chalmers Co. (agricultural and military use)
    1.500 automotive batteries from the Price Battery Corp.
    1.000 aircraft provided by the North American Aviation Co.
    612 airplanes from the Douglas Aircraft Co.
    600 trucks from Mack.
    500 Allison aircraft engines.
    500 half-tracks from Minneapolis Moline Co.
    400 airplanes from Bell Aircraft
    400 electric motors from Wagner Electric Co.
    400 truck chassis by GM (see Ford above)
    310 tons of ball bearings from the Fafnir Company.
    200 aircraft provided by the U.S. Navy
    200 aircraft engines by Aeromarine
    100 tractor-trailer units by GM (trucks)
    70 aircraft engines by Pratt & Whitney

    In the end, Ultra and more dedicated Allied naval efforts helped to secure the northern lend-lease routes from German attacks. The Kriegsmarine lost a number of heavy ships for their efforts as well.

    The following table, not an inclusive one by any means, shows the extent of lend-lease aid the Western Allies provided to the Soviet Union from 01 October 1941 to 31 March 1946 (not a typo, aid went on well after WWII ended). CW - Commonwealth contribution; US - American contribution:

    Aircraft - 7.411 (CW) + 14.795 (US) = 22.206
    Automotive:
    --- 1.5 ton trucks 151.053 (US)
    --- 2.5 ton trucks 200.662 (US)
    --- Willys Jeeps 77.972 (US)
    Bren Gun Carriers - 2.560 (CW)
    Boots - 15 million pairs (US)
    Communications equipment:
    --- Field phones - 380.135 (US)
    --- Radios - 40.000 (US)
    --- Telephone cable - 1.25 million miles (US)
    Cotton cloth - 107 million square yards (US)
    Foodstuffs - 4.5 million tons (US)
    Leather - 49.000 tons (US)
    Motorcycles - 35.170 (US)
    Locomotives - 1.981 units (US)
    Rolling stock - 11.155 units (US)
    Tanks - 5.218 (CW) + 7.537 (US) = 12.755
    Tractors - 8.701 (US)
    Trucks - 4.020 (CW) + 357.883 (US) = 361.903

    In the early 1930’s the U.S. helped lay the foundations for a formidable Soviet truck production capability. During the war, Soviet production efforts were augmented through lend-lease aid. In terms of truck usage, U.S. lend-lease trucks generally went directly to front line combat units. Soviet built trucks were generally used in rear areas. Chevrolet, Dodge, Ford, Studebaker, etc., all could be found on the eastern front. The Soviet Union ended the Second World War by having over 650.000 trucks available for use. Of those, 58% were Soviet in origin, 33% British or U.S. and the remaining percentage captured from the Germans.

    U.S. lend-lease food supplies were sufficient to supply 6 million Soviet soldiers with one pound of (quality) consumables for each day of the war. Also, U.S. food supplies, such as canned Spam, had a seemingly indefinite shelf-life and could be stored anywhere without spoilage when compared to one of the standard Soviet military staple diets, dried fish (consuming dried fish causes one to drink more - this in turn increases the number of "breaks" one has to take - and that is not a desirable condition if one is close proximity to enemy lines).

    Lend-lease aid amounted to approximately 10-12% of the total Soviet war production effort. While this does not seem like a significant amount, having 10% more key supplies available could make the difference between holding the line to going on the offensive.


    The 10-12% is in actual materials. Consider again the beginning of the material, with the likes of Henry Ford teaching them how to mass mass produce (helped them make their own in mass quantities). And note the Spam. Spam won the war (since as Napolean so aptly said, an army travels on its stomach):

    Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II (Book Review)

    Lastly, well and truly, from a comment to that piece by an Albert:

    As the book points out. All of Russians first-class aviation gasoline was supplied by the USA. A great deal of food was american. Their boots, most of the uniform material was as well. Plus rubber for the their tires, all their aluminum, fully 1/3 of their munitions, over 500,000 trucks which were all far better than any Russian produced during the war (about 200,000). The 9000 or so tanks supplied by the allies were a small amount but helped. Upgunned (76mm) Shermans were a big part of the Russian drive through the Balkans, where hundreds of them participatedm and had a measure of success. Aerocobras, P40s, C-47 and A-20's (18000+) all considerably assisted the Russian war effort. Almost all telephone communication was over american phones late in the war. The Russians produced 92 locomotives during the war. They got 2000 through lend-lease. The numbers go on and on, but a picture of the value of lend-lease should start making itself clear.

    The western allies had far more than a marginal role in defeating the Germans. This role was to tie down the majority of manufactured items being in the west and not in the east.

    Well over half the luftwaffe was engaged in the west from 1942-45, and 75% of german aircraft casualties were against the Western Allies. each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. The Germans built over 1000. A panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 german tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war of the atlantic. Think 40,000 panthers might have made a difference on the eastern front? Each V2 rocket cost in labor and material, the same as 3.5 fighter planes. The germans launched over 3000 V2's. Do the math on that.

    The British and Americans deployed over 20,000 heavy bombers against the Germans, suffering horrendous casaulites, and also doling out great destruction. The Russians never developed one.

    There were also 10000 heavy caliber anti-aircraft guns defending the reich. Do you think those would have shored up German defenses in the east?

    What would have happend if Rommel's Africa corps and the 30+ german divisions in France would have been in the don bend in the fall of 1942 protecting Stalingrad, instead of waiting for the British and Americans to land? What would have happed if the 400,000 good troops station in Norway could have helped Army Group North capture Leningrad? What would have happened if the 30+ divisions fighting in Italy and the Balkans for the Germans could have been freed to fight against the Russians in the south? What would have happed if in 1944, the german armies trying to hold the Allies out of France would have been sent to BelaRussia in prior to Bagraton?

    The Germans were never really able to muster much more than half their real strength against the Ruissias. They were fighting a technological war against the brits and americans that required a huge effort from a manufacturing standpoint to counter. Russians give the allies no credit for tying down so many German resources and destroying so many others (30% of total production in 1944) with their strategic bombing campaign.

    I suppose if I lost 25 million peple in the war, I might feel the same way. But that would be ignoring the real facts regarding the relative contribution of the Western Allies in the defeat of the German nation.
    Excellent information.

    Stalin is supposed to have put more bluntly and brutally: "The British gave time, the Americans gave money, but the Russians gave blood".

    With due respect to Uncle Joe, the money (i.e. the industrial muscle) was the decisive factor.

    PS Both Khruschev and Zhukov acknowledged privately that the Russians could not have driven all the way to Berlin without Allied assistance.
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  3. #53
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    Quote Originally Posted by Munnkeyman View Post
    The Moderators will kill me for going off topic repeatedly and sorry jmcc

    But here is a link to a Russian site with interviews with troops who fought in the Red Army.
    Here is one with a Red Army Sherman commander, apparently the shells cooked off in their racks far more easily in T-34's
    this didn't happen with the Sherman and Red Army Shermans were supplied with Diesels.
    Google Translate

    Yes there is a common misperception that the Sherman was a very bad tank. I recall seeing a documentery where a former red army tank driver saaid the Sherman had better armour than the t34 and was very popular with red army crews.

    A sherman fitted with a diesel engine and a high velocity gun was a very effective tank by the standards of WWII. Late in the war the Americans finally fitted high velocity guns in their Shermans.
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  4. #54
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmcc View Post
    The Soviets had more than one spy there, apparently. The thing about the crypto that was being broken at Bletchley Park (BP) was that some of it provided intelligence that was so good that some people didn't believe it. I think that the Soviets were given details of what the Axis had planned at Kursk anyway. The Soviets relied a lot on human intelligence and some of it (the Red Orchestra, Richard Sorge) was the best.

    Regards...jmcc
    IIRC from Richard Overy's book Russia's war, the soviets were very suspicious of the British. Some of the intelligence regarding Kursk which came from the British officially was contradictory. The soviets preferred to get their intelligence through spies.
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  5. #55
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmcc View Post
    I think that the Soviets were given details of what the Axis had planned at Kursk anyway.
    Regards...jmcc
    The British actually provided some misleading information through official channels. They suggested that the Kursk offensive had been called off. It may have been a genuine mistake but it surely fuelled soviet suspicions.
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  6. #56
    Catalpa Catalpa is offline
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    Quote Originally Posted by parentheses View Post
    The British actually provided some misleading information through official channels. They suggested that the Kursk offensive had been called off. It may have been a genuine mistake but it surely fuelled soviet suspicions.
    It was cancelled the Offensive again and again before Hitler gave the go ahead so maybe that's why that info was fed to the Soviets

    - it was no surprise to STAVKA when it came
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