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Ah Well
Section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide Act) 1993 states "A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years."
The case law is very limited in the whole area of what can be termed Euthanasia in this country. It came before the Courts here in "In Re a Ward of Court"
In In Re a Ward of Court, the Irish Courts were confronted with the issue of whether the removal of life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitated woman who had been made a ward of court was legal. In the Supreme Court, Hamilton CJ insisted that the case did not concern euthanasia, if by that term the taking of a positive action to cause death was implied. The Court was adamant that it could never condone any course of action or treatment aimed at terminating life or accelerating death. The Court found that the case was in fact allowing nature to take its course, and allowing the Ward to die naturally. The Court relied on the distinction between an act and an omission in making an order, in the best interests of the Ward, to remove hydration and nutrition. Thus the distinction between an act and an omission is of great importance in the Irish context of end of life decisions.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the personal right to bodily integrity, and found that providing the ward with nourishment by a naso-gastric tube constituted an interference with the ward’s bodily integrity. That case also established that no-one could be compelled to undergo medical treatment, even where the refusal of such treatment meant certain death, as to do so would constitute an impermissible infringement on the right to bodily integrity.
The case of In Re a Ward of Court, provides interesting commentary on the right to life, and examines how the courts may resolve a conflict that could arise between the right to life and other unenumerated constitutional rights. It is important to note that the Court was very anxious to establish that the case did not concern euthanasia, furthermore Hamilton CJ stated unequivocally that the Court could “never sanction steps to terminate life”.
The Chief Justice considered that the case concerned whether under Irish Constitutional Law, artificial feeding and antibiotic drugs may be withheld from the ward, thus allowing the ward to die a natural death, which was her constitutional right … O’Flaherty J held that the case did not concern euthanasia, but rather the withdrawal of invasive medical treatment, in order to allow nature to take its course. Egan J, dissenting, held that the removal of the tube was to kill a human being regardless of how euphemistically the term is worded. He also found that because the ward was not in a complete PVS, she had cognitive function, however minimal, and thus her life was entitled to constitutional protection.
In the High Court decision, the right to die in accordance with nature was recognised by Lynch J. as a natural part of the right to life. In addition, he concluded that this right to die in accordance with nature, included the right to refuse medical treatment, including life-saving and life-prolonging treatment, even where such refusal would lead to certain death. Lynch J. founded his conclusion on the basis of the right to self-determination.
In the Supreme Court, Hamilton CJ recognised the right of every individual to life and he found that where a conflict arose between constitutional rights, the right to life would take precedence over any other rights, through the application of a priority of rights. Dying is an inevitable consequence of life, and therefore the right to life necessarily implies the right to die in accordance with nature, and not to have life artificially maintained, unless so desired. In determining the nature of the right to life, Hamilton CJ built upon Walsh J’s findings in G v. An Bord Uchtala and found that the rights to privacy, bodily integrity and self-determination also sprung from the right to life. There is a strong presumption in favour of taking all steps to safeguard and preserve a life, save in exceptional circumstances.
In the same case, Denham J found that the right to life was the paramount personal right, and that the respect for this right as required by the Constitution was absolute. However, the right to life itself is not absolute, in the same way that life is not absolute, but rather it must be balanced against the State’s duty to protect and vindicate life. Endorsing the findings of the learned trial judge, Denham J found that the refusing of medical treatment is a part of the right to privacy, but as the right to privacy is not absolute, she found that the right to refuse medical treatment is similarly not absolute, but rather is subject to the State’s duty to protect and vindicate life.
It was further held that the right to die naturally, with dignity and with minimum suffering is constituent to the right to privacy. However, the Courts have fallen short of declaring that the right to life implies its corollary; the right to die. The Courts have recognised that the process of dying is in an inevitable consequence of life and that the right to life necessarily implies the right to have nature take its course and to die a natural death. Where the individual decides he/she does not want his/her life to be artificially maintained by treatment, which merely prolongs life and has no curative effect, the right to life implies the right to have nature take its course. In that case the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by a majority, and treatment was removed from the Ward and she died in accordance with nature.
.... This is about as close as the Irish situation is presently at as concerns the right to life, or right to die, or as regards the area of Euthanasia. This is as far as any case law goes as can be relied upon or argued for or against. There is no specific legislation in place to deal with such arising situations other than the prohibition against assisted suicide in the 1993 Act. If and when this arises to be dealt with here, it shall be left up to the Court to decide upon presumably on a case by case basis no with specific legislative provisions to fall back or rely upon.
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