The Dutch health care system rates close to the top in Europe,so its features should be of interest. Some informative articles on it,
"Profiles of six health care systems..." and "Quality Development of Health Care in the Netherlands" are at www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/sen ... ver1-e.pdf and www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Grol_q ... ction=4039
Some points of interest largely paraphrased from the articles:
[]Government mandated insurance financed out of employer and employee payroll taxes are paid over to 25 non-profit regionally based insurers,with a single insurer covering 100% of the population in a specific region. They can compete on price and quality and offer packages with different services. These insurers can lose their business in the competitive process apparently,but no data was given on that.
[]About 30% of the population with the highest incomes are free to buy their own insurance plan.
[]High risk groups must be offered insurance with a cap on premiums and a government operated scheme spreads the risk of covering them over all
age groups.
[]Most of the country's more than 100 acute care hospitals are privately owned, non-profit organisations. Their medical specialists include both employees and private practitioners working within hospitals.
[]Negotiations of hospital budgets were based on estimates of efficient operating costs,changes of population and volume of operations performed.
[]This is gradually being changed to a new system of diagnostic treatment combinations (DBCs) which assign a price to each product or service. This increases transparency and competition among hospitals. It is different from the comparable diagnostic-related group payments in America in that it includes specialists' salaries.
[]Payments to primary care physicians include a capitation fee per patient (based on age?) and a fee per consultation, plus other payments,including incentives for meeting quality and efficiency indicators.
[]After-hours emergency care is provided by cooperatives with between 100,000 and 400,000 patients assigned to them.
[]An inspectorate for health care develops performance indicators for health care providers. Clinical indicators include data on prescriptions, ordering of tests,referrals to hospitals and preventive measures (influenza shots,pap smears).
[]The inspectorate in recent years requires hospitals to collect data on 20 performance indicators,including mortality and myocardial infarction or stroke,wound infection,pressure ulcer incidence and medication errors.The results are reported on a freely accessible web site. This initiative demonstrably identifies gaps in quality.
In conclusion, the Dutch insurer system coupled with strong government regulation is far preferable to the HSE model. An insurer presumably must be competitive or risk losing the business of covering its region,unlike the HSE with its jobs for life culture.
However,given that Ireland's population is about a quarter that of the Netherlands, it may not be feasible to copy that system exactly here for two major reasons. First, doing so would lead to duplication in all regions of very expensive services better provided by monopolies or oligopolies eg cancer treatment centres. To avoid this duplication, insurers could separately insure a monopoly service on condition that the service could only be provided within the designated regions of the monopoly (say within 100 miles radius of a cancer treatment clinic) or the oligopoly. The monopoly service could comprise departments of several hospitals, so a situation could arise in a hospital where one insurer works with the monopoly department,with another insurer working with the rest of the departments.
Second, Ireland's population could probably efficiently support no more than five insurers,which would not be very competitive, especially if competition forced two of them to cease business. Still,this would be preferable to the unaccountable HSE monopoly.In the event of insurers ceasing business, the government could offer tax incentives to attract new insurers.
The Dutch sytem of appointing a single insurer for a specific region may be absolutely essential to control costs of marketing as well as overhead percentage costs in thinly populated areas outside of Greater Dublin and Cork.
The system of DBC pricing would improve the economic efficiency of hospitals. This is better than just dropping money into the laps of hospitals based on arbitrary budgeting criteria.
Finally, the articles don't comment on whether the Dutch system's inspectorate does enough auditing of patient treatments to prevent cutting of corners on expensive treatments and whether insurers make sufficient use of evidence-based medicine to curb doctors' unnecessary treatments. There may be an assumption that non-profits can be trusted more than for profit providers. That overlooks the risk that non-profits may pad their own wages and salaries at the expense of patients' treatments.



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