CDU Document: "A Strong Europe – A Bright Future for Germany" (November 2011)
Troika Document:Assurance of Compliance in the 2nd GRC Programme: (January 2012)3. If, despite these measures, a country finds itself unable to meet its debt obligations, then a systematic process of debt reduction will need to put in place. The aims of this process will be to restore the country’s financial capacity to act and to safeguard public services. During this phase, the European Commission should provide the affected eurozone country with a commissioner responsible for budgetary savings, who would oversee the use of budgetary funds and the implementation of any restructuring measures that may be required. This commissioner should also have the right to intervene if the country does not meet its obligations. The whole process must be designed in such a way that private creditors are involved in each phase of the restructuring and that a chain reaction in the markets, or indeed the risk of contagion for other eurozone countries, is avoided. If a Member State of the monetary union does not wish to comply with the rules associated with the single currency in the long term, or is not in a position to do so, it has the option, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon on withdrawal from the European Union, of withdrawing from the eurozone, but without leaving the European Union. It would then be on the same footing as those countries that do not have the euro as their currency.
You have 1:36 minutes to guess which one of these things is not like the other:2. Transfer of national budgetary sovereignty
Budget consolidation has to be put under a strict steering and control system. Given the disappointing
compliance so far, Greece has to accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level for a
certain period of time. A budget commissioner has to be appointed by the Eurogroup with the task of
ensuring budgetary control. He must have the power a) to implement a centralized reporting and
surveillance system covering all major blocks of expenditure in the Greek budget, b) to veto decisions
not in line with the budgetary targets set by the Troika and c) will be tasked to ensure compliance with
the above mentioned rule to prioritize debt service.
The new surveillance and institutional approach should be formulated in the MoU as follows: “In the
case of non-compliance, confirmed by the ECB, IMF and EU COM, a new budget commissioner
appointed by the Eurogroup would help implementing reforms. The commissioner will have broad
surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line
with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.” Greece has to ensure that
the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional
amendment.



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