First, would international confidence in Ireland be sustained in circumstances where the whole of the banking sector was under the wing of the State? Investors would surely give the Irish market a wide berth in the future – not just in the banking sector – if the State undertook such an extreme step.
It is difficult to see a credible exit strategy from wholesale bank nationalisation. The article talks about “temporary” nationalisation but what does that mean in practice? I suspect that the banking sector would remain under State control much longer than advocates of system-wide nationalisation have in mind.
Second, would wholesale international money markets be prepared to fund a nationalised banking sector? Banks in Ireland, as elsewhere, remain very dependent on their continuing ability to raise funds from abroad to finance their activities and meet the economy’s needs. Banks with a continuing market presence and operating subject to market disciplines and constraints are best equipped to compete for funds in the international marketplace.
It is true that the deposits and some of the debts of our banks are guaranteed by the State. But it is naïve to think that providers of funds do not differentiate between banks with a market presence and nationalised banks.
Third, as far as the successful implementation of Nama is concerned, what matters is the State’s ability to achieve an outcome that is good for the economy and good for the taxpayer. It is not at all clear why nationalisation of the entire banking system is believed to better secure these goals.
Under the Nama initiative the taxpayer is protected from unforeseen losses through the Government’s commitment to levy the banks for any losses incurred.
The State has already, under the recapitalisation programme, potential for benefiting from the upside in terms of the recovery in the share prices of the two main banks. The State has an option to purchase at a very low price 25 per cent of the existing ordinary shares in Bank of Ireland, and will soon have a similar claim on AIB.
In addition, as banks’ share prices rise the taxpayer will gain through the equity injection that the Minister for Finance has said the State will make, if necessary, into the cleansed banks following loan transfers.
The valuation issues related to impaired assets highlighted in the article exist irrespective of the ownership structure of the banks. There needs to be a detailed and comprehensive process for assessing asset quality and determining capital needs prior to asset transfer. This approach will be inherent to the execution of Nama by Government.
It is also important to note that, contrary to some popular perceptions, Nama is not a bailout for developers. Nama will acquire loans at an appropriate discount from the face value of the loans held on the banks’ balance sheets. Developers whose loans are transferred to Nama, however, will continue to be liable for the entire face value of their loan obligations.
In conclusion, Nama is designed to achieve the restructuring of the banks’ balance sheets so they can play their appropriate commercial role in meeting the financial needs of our community. Would a nationalised industry effectively meet these needs?
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that private banks perform better than nationalised banks. International studies have shown that too much “policy-directed” lending by wholly state-owned banks has retarded economic growth. The simple truth is that nationalisation creates a significant risk of a political rather than a commercial allocation of credit. This would be bad for the banks but even worse for the country.
Nationalisation of the whole of the Irish banking system would send out the inaccurate and unwarranted message internationally that the whole of the banking system was non-viable; this would be a very damaging message at a time that the Government is working to rebuild international confidence in Ireland and its banks.