It seems Europe is evaluating their stance on bank losses (senior bondholders) included, due to mistakes made in the past, could we Irish include Irish mistakes by being so bend over backwards, three bags full sir and fully compliant with our european overlords demands.

We're told we are great little boys and girls, gold stars all round, but we get treated like rubbish, we get fed scraps from the Greek situation arising in an interest rate reduction. You would think we would get rewarded alot more by now, or is it the same repetitive line from the goverment, they're rebuilding our good name, well, it's costing us a fortune.

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I thought burning the senior bondholders brought the curtains down on the show, you know the guards won't get paid, nor the teachers, nor the nurses and as Pascal would say from Fine Gael the social welfare payments would freeze, and what about Leo from FG, our sovereign bonds would sore, like they did in Denmark (NOT)

Well it seems that we Irish may of taken the wrong path, and isn't it annoying when you hear Juncker or Triceht talk about how much we Irish bailed out our banks (can we have a partial refund please?)

And finally we have the current promissory note fiasco, it is obvious that Fine Gael's approach is too conservative, we're left looking like the gullible laughing stock of europe.

From Constantin Gurdgiev blog today.

Per EU: "An effective resolution regime should:
•Achieve, for banks, similar results to those of normal insolvency proceedings, in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors
•Shield as much as possible any negative effect on financial stability and limit the recourse to taxpayers' money
•Ensure legal certainty, transparency and predictability as to the treatment that shareholders and creditors will receive, so as to provide clarity to investors to enable them to assess the risk associated with their investments and make informed investment decisions prior to insolvency."

In all the cases creditors and shareholders do not get paid in full."

There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB

True Economics: 2/4/2012: Banks bailouts and bonds eligibility

Originally Posted by sport02

There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB

True Economics: 2/4/2012: Banks bailouts and bonds eligibility

Possible explanation - some of the major banks are in trouble and too big to be bailed out?

Per EU: "An effective resolution regime should:
•Achieve, for banks, similar results to those of normal insolvency proceedings, in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors
•Shield as much as possible any negative effect on financial stability and limit the recourse to taxpayers' money
•Ensure legal certainty, transparency and predictability as to the treatment that shareholders and creditors will receive, so as to provide clarity to investors to enable them to assess the risk associated with their investments and make informed investment decisions prior to insolvency."

Yeah...you see the bit about "an effective resolution regime" there? Can you tell me what Ireland's resolution regime was in September 2008? Or, indeed, what a 'resolution regime' is?

Originally Posted by sport02

There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB

True Economics: 2/4/2012: Banks bailouts and bonds eligibility

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/...bail_in_en.pdf
4 years after the initial crisis these proposals reach discussion paper level, released on April 1st.

Following the 'ol "pacta sunt servanda" and reported EU/ECB offense taken at daring to question the promissory note arrangement, it's highly questionable if the proposals above include for retrofit here. Maybe in the context of a fiscal union and/or new euro club. The government appear convinced that it (a bank debt restructuring) will happen though and that eh..sovereignty will be reclaimed.
Mixed messages everywhere, including the recent ECB & Bundesbank one permitting the rejection by national central banks of the sovereign bonds of countries in "programmes", while at the same time assisting in designing programmes to "succeed".

Originally Posted by Doodah

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/...bail_in_en.pdf
4 years after the initial crisis these proposals reach discussion paper level, released on April 1st.

Following the 'ol "pacta sunt servanda" and reported EU/ECB offense taken at daring to question the promissory note arrangement, it's highly questionable if the proposals above include for retrofit here. Maybe in the context of a fiscal union and/or new euro club. The government appear convinced that it (a bank debt restructuring) will happen though and that eh..sovereignty will be reclaimed.
Mixed messages everywhere, including the recent ECB & Bundesbank one permitting the rejection by national central banks of the sovereign bonds of countries in "programmes", while at the same time assisting in designing programmes to "succeed".

They can't really include a retrofit, unless we choose to let another bank fail and go into a resolution process. Before this crisis, believe it or not, a good number of EU countries - Ireland included - had no bank resolution mechanism. Not so much a case of "too big to fail" but of there being no bank failure mechanism available in law. We are now, as part of the troika programme, creating a bank resolution mechanism.

This is, again, the kind of thing that bedeviled the eurozone when it came to this crisis - no plan B. Not even bits of a plan B. William Hague described the euro crisis as being like a building with no fire exits - a typically half-right, and half-wrong British Tory analysis. The euro is a commitment, and commitments don't ever get built-in exits, because they're commitments - but the analogy works well when you consider that there was no fire safety plan, no fire extinguishers, no fire-proof doors, no fire alarm, no fire marshals, and no fire drills.

As 'Arfur' Daly observed, in life you don't get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate.

Ireland didn't have very good negotiators; look at them.

Originally Posted by ibis

They can't really include a retrofit, unless we choose to let another bank fail and go into a resolution process. Before this crisis, believe it or not, a good number of EU countries - Ireland included - had no bank resolution mechanism. Not so much a case of "too big to fail" but of there being no bank failure mechanism available in law. We are now, as part of the troika programme, creating a bank resolution mechanism.

This is, again, the kind of thing that bedeviled the eurozone when it came to this crisis - no plan B. Not even bits of a plan B. William Hague described the euro crisis as being like a building with no fire exits - a typically half-right, and half-wrong British Tory analysis. The euro is a commitment, and commitments don't ever get built-in exits, because they're commitments - but the analogy works well when you consider that there was no fire safety plan, no fire extinguishers, no fire-proof doors, no fire alarm, no fire marshals, and no fire drills.

This reads like EU criticism. What's going on?
A bit of blame (and cost) sharing would be in order but then that's usually met with the charge of responsibility avoidance and attempting to blame everyone but oneself whilst enforcing the bank debt socialisation policy.

It appears that almost any EU law could be passed, amended or rescinded with reference to the maintaining of price stability and supporting the monetary policy of the EU.

Do the EU/ECB know what they are doing or are they making it up as they go along? Between statements by Schauble and others that the crisis serves to enable a fiscal union, the ECB €1 trillion lending to banks @ 1% (including 450+ German banks), bailout programmes supposedly with the intention of succeeding, undermining of the programmes by the EU/ECB by enabling rejection of sovereign bonds and now debate in Germany over the actual legality of the Fiscal pact.....
Is there a plan? A grand plan or is it everyone for themselves?

What did you expect? European banks got their money from Ireland, Ireland is not their problem.

Originally Posted by Doodah

This reads like EU criticism. What's going on?

Well, posters could revisit their stereotypes...most criticisms of the EU are idiotic, and I spend so much time responding irritably to those that I rarely get to vent my own.

Originally Posted by Doodah

A bit of blame (and cost) sharing would be in order but then that's usually met with the charge of responsibility avoidance and attempting to blame everyone but oneself whilst enforcing the bank debt socialisation policy.

It appears that almost any EU law could be passed, amended or rescinded with reference to the maintaining of price stability and supporting the monetary policy of the EU.

Do the EU/ECB know what they are doing or are they making it up as they go along? Between statements by Schauble and others that the crisis serves to enable a fiscal union, the ECB €1 trillion lending to banks @ 1% (including 450+ German banks), bailout programmes supposedly with the intention of succeeding, undermining of the programmes by the EU/ECB by enabling rejection of sovereign bonds and now debate in Germany over the actual legality of the Fiscal pact.....
Is there a plan? A grand plan or is it everyone for themselves?

There isn't a grand plan, but it's not quite everybody for themselves either. The EU - that is, the Commission & Parliament, as opposed to the member states and the ECB - is doing very little. They don't have the money, the political clout, or the permission to do anything very much, so it's down to the member states on the one hand, and the ECB on the other. The member states are engaged in a clumsy process of political negotiation, while the ECB acts - as central banks do - independently, and sometimes at cross-purposes to the politicians.

You know the old adage about a camel being a horse designed by a committee? Well, what you're watching is basically camel assembly under live-fire conditions.

And the best bit is that that's the horse we're supposed to be riding out of the crisis on.

There is one simple truth. The willingness of a creditor to lend is based on his perception of your FUTURE ability to repay the loan. It is NOT based on your PAST record.

To give an example. Britain used "own" half the world. No creditors today would lend it half the world's GDP, because it would not be able to repay, no matter what past glories it has had.


We have been operating on a fallacy for years that we won't get credit if we default. In fact, we won't get credit anyway until our economy stops being a basket case.

D