About 7 or 8 years ago a friend of mine who is a manager at a Chinese state owned bank was telling me about their own bailout. The banks were essentially on their knees after being forced into a massive programme of politically-directed lending. This lending had been going on for a while and was accelerated in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. The net effect was that the banks had a massive build up of non-performing loans and were in need of an epic bailout. Naturally enough, the state stepped in to bail them out, and their NPLs were transferred to 4 (?) asset management companies in return for government backed bonds.
Time passed on and the Chinese economy returned to red-hot growth. As our banks were making questionable bets, the Chinese banks started to grow more profitable and more powerful. Massive IPOs in HK left them well capitalised, the profits of growth left them in a robust position, and they looked on with justified amusement at the calamitous fate of many Western banks.
Then the financial meltdown happened and Chinese exports dropped off the edge of a cliff. Eager to maintain social stability and fearful of the impact of mass unemployment on political stability, the government decided to flood the economy with more state-directed lending. The equivalent of over a trillion dollars was pumped into the economy from January to September of this year, mostly into capital projects, and the specific details of the projects funded were left to local and provincial governments. Shortly thereafter the stock market took off on another one of its mad little tears, indicting that a lot of the loans were being used for the purposes of speculation rather than investment in real assets. Even so, the majority of it flowed into various construction projects and assorted bridges to no where to the extent that a huge % of this years growth came from stimulus spending.
The result of all of this is that Chinese banks are now in a somewhat less than invincible position. The bonds from the earlier bailout mature very soon and the latest indications are that they asset managment companies can't pay. As far as I know there are about 800 or 900 billion RMB worth of bonds that may fall into this category. Add to that the 1 trillion USD plus in forced political lending from the recent stimulus, much of which was clearly used for speculation and white elephants, and the things begin to look less than invincible. Could it be that the Chinese are falling into the same trap that Japan fell into in the 1980s and that the US have been stuck in for a while now?
I know that the fundamentals are different and that both the Chinese economy and the Chinese banks are in a much stonger position than those of, say, the USA or GBR, but it can be argued that the days of massive export led growth are over (mainly because their customers are broke). As growth slows, just like it did for Japan and all the other former tigers, can they indefinitely respond by having more government-driven lending? Already many of the smaller banks can onlt barely meet their capital adequacy requirements. On top of that, can China also pay for both its current unfunded pension liabilities and expand its welfare to cover the 80% who are currently uncovered? And also, can it meet all these challenges while at simultaneously dealing with a chronic water shortage, a massive environmental clean up bill, and the challenge of up to 70,000 riots per year?



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