Atheists are having it too easy.

[greenporcupine]

I have a serious problem with those who worry so much about bodily freedom,but
forget freedom of ideas etc.

[Almanac]

Now if only that was what I was claiming...but I'm not.

Argument B, on the other hand, requires neither assumption. It's a simple statement. Certain patterns of relating to others are evolutionarily advantageous for social animals, and we can therefore expect to find these patterns dictating behaviour in evolutionarily successful social animals. To state that they are therefore right is a fallacy, but I am not stating that, only that they are what causes us to have a 'moral sense'.

I understand what you are saying. But you do claim that the individual subject experiences the sense that these behaviours are morally right. I appreciate that people do argue in this vein but it's the nature of the moral experience- the perception of a non-natural kind of goodness and badness- which renders this claim controversial. (I should have been clearer in my previous discussions on this point with you.)

As has already been pointed out, that 'evidence' also leads to the conclusion that the Sun revolves around the Earth. I don't think it's necessary to say more than that - a commonly held fallacy is no less a fallacy for being commonly held.

I don't think it does.

I would not agree with a law allowing slavery, but plenty of people have historically done so.

I know that but I'm asking your opinion: would it or would it not still be a good law? Can't you emphatically say that it would?

[Almanac]

I still don't understand. We experience feelings of revulsion or approval and we experience people using moral language, but I don't know what it means to 'experience morality'. You seem to be saying that moral relativism must be false because we have to think about it before accepting it...

You still don't understand? Really? That's strange. I grasped the argument, which is a straightforward phenomenological one, with little difficulty. All it requires is interior reflection and reflection on how we use moral language. Now if you were a subjectivist it might be possible to excuse mental confusion but you are an objectivist. Are you sure you are not arguing for the sake of arguing?

I still don't know what this mysterious thing is that we experience. Can you give me a concrete example of a single 'moral experience' which begets moral language and indicates that morality is objective?

I already did a couple of times.

Do you experience joy, happiness, sadness? Is morality the only part of your interiority you have difficulty understanding as an experience?

[ibis]

I understand what you are saying. But you do claim that the individual subject experiences the sense that these behaviours are morally right. I appreciate that people do argue in this vein but it's the nature of the moral experience- the perception of a non-natural kind of goodness and badness- which renders this claim controversial. (I should have been clearer in my previous discussions on this point with you.)

I'm not sure what's "non-natural" about it, though. That looks rather like another term that re-introduces the assumption that morality is something external to us.

If I have a feeling that something is 'not right' in my environment, and which is the result of evolutionary adaptation to predators, I don't think either of us have any difficulty calling that 'natural'.

If, on the other hand, I have a feeling that something is 'not right' in my dealings with another person, and which is the result of evolutionary adaptation to social living, it seems to me you wish to introduce the idea that this is something 'non-natural', and without any justification.

We have a lot of adaptations to living socially - we have theories of mind, empathy, sympathy, the various mirroring patterns, etc etc. What's so strange about the idea that we perceive relations as 'right' when they would lead to a better group outcome?

I don't think it does.

Indeed.

I know that but I'm asking your opinion: would it or would it not still be a good law? Can't you emphatically say that it would?

I can say emphatically, by my morality, that it would be a bad law, whether approved by the majority or not.

[Mercurial]

You still don't understand? Really? That's strange. I grasped the argument, which is a straightforward phenomenological one, with little difficulty. All it requires is interior reflection and reflection on how we use moral language. Now if you were a subjectivist it might be possible to excuse mental confusion but you are an objectivist. Are you sure you are not arguing for the sake of arguing?

I already did a couple of times.

Do you experience joy, happiness, sadness? Is morality the only part of your interiority you have difficulty understanding as an experience?

Alright, so the problem I'm having here seems to be with the phenomenological aspect of what you're calling some kind of 'moral experience'. I think I know what it feels like to be elated, or depressed and so on, but I am not at all certain that I know what it feels like to be...what? Moral? I can feel anger or sadness at what I perceive to be moral wrongs, but this doesn't seem to me to be an experience of 'morality' as such.

This strikes me as little different from a person's phenomenological reaction on seeing a particularly appealing painting. I wouldn't derive from the fact that I find instinctively something to be beautiful that beauty must be objective. It might lead me to conclude that beauty exists, but a moral relativist thinks morality exists, just that it's not necessarily the same for everyone.

[Mercurial]

Now if you were a subjectivist it might be possible to excuse mental confusion but you are an objectivist. Are you sure you are not arguing for the sake of arguing?

I should add that I am more of an objectivist (I prefer 'universalist' but I don't think it makes a difference) by default. That is to say, if moral relativism is true, I don't think it matters much. I will still act as though morality is universal, and if someone's particular brand if morality says I'm wrong, well, of morality is relative then that's just relative to you so it doesn't really matter to me in terms of how I act.

[citizen pat]

I dont believe that anyone is really an athiest....but a lot of people are anti-thiest for various reasons...therefore there is no point arguing about it.

I can accept that-not arguing about it - but how would you know if someone was not 'really an athiest?'

[citizen pat]

An expression of the primal fear of the dark which many of us have, child and adult alike. (Or do you know kids who fear the boogey man in daylight?)



We tell them that this is true, as I already said.



You know kids who believe in all these? You know them personally? Have a think about it.

Ok , had a think about it
I do know kids
and hey I was a kid one time and its what we were lead to believe and its the same about gods..
god then is the only fantasy..is that your point?
Have a think about it yourself -if you get the time out from patronising everyone else .

[Almanac]

Ok , had a think about it

And two weeks later. You realise that you do know kids. But no clarification as to whether or not they believe in real, physical unicorns. Maybe they've seen some?

[Almanac]

Alright, so the problem I'm having here seems to be with the phenomenological aspect of what you're calling some kind of 'moral experience'. I think I know what it feels like to be elated, or depressed and so on, but I am not at all certain that I know what it feels like to be...what? Moral? I can feel anger or sadness at what I perceive to be moral wrongs, but this doesn't seem to me to be an experience of 'morality' as such.

Right. What about your conscience? You are aware of it, I assume? Could not possibly be described as an experience...