I think the Wiccan example is helpful to distinguish what you might call two distinct atheist 'projects' (that is, projects which are shared by a decent amount of atheists but which are not necessarily aims of any atheist in particular.)
The first is the philosophical project of arguing against particular religious beliefs, while the second is arguing against the political imposition of religious beliefs upon those who do not share them. For example, I have an Anglican friend whose religious views bewilder and frustrate me, but I would consider it rude to engage him in an argument over it, since his beliefs, however strange I find them to be, do not negatively affect me. When it comes to individuals who would impose their religious beliefs through law, however, the terms of engagement are quite clearly different.
Veidt was right!
I feel another sub thread coming on, so I won't labour the point.
The atheistic position is not the logical contradiction of the theistic one. It is a counter assertion. There are plenty of assertions that can be counter to each other and yet both be rational. It is rational for example to believe in the probable existence of intelligent life in other parts of the universe. It is also rational to believe that this is improbable.
Atheists are free to believe that theists are irrational. Theists are usually happy to accept that atheists are not irrational or even that they are rational. When a theist makes a claim that their belief is rational it is of course open to atheist to attack the substance of their argument
And do you feel comfortable with the article's questioning of Collin's freedom of speech?
I suppose I would next have to ask what you mean by rational (and what the difference is between a contradiction and a counter assertion), but you’re right - it’s not really worth getting into.
I don’t think the article questioned Collins’ freedom of speech, quite the opposite in fact, it explicitly acknowledged it.
Veidt was right!
He acknowledged his legal right but the the thrust of his argument was that he should not have written as he did.
And we will never get any where if you constantly ask to define ordinary laguage terms.
Good night.
Yes I know that a culturally defined time period cannot have a moral quality, and when does night actual begin, and is it one word or two and
zzzzzzzzzzz
You've phrased the claim as an empirical one - is it possible for a baptised Christian to be a soldier? It's unclear if you mean: is it permissible for a baptised Christian to be a soldier? Or if you mean: is it a contradiction in terms to say that a baptised Christian is a soldier? (Clearly it's physically possible for someone to be baptised a Christian and then become a soldier.)
'Reasonable' is probably a better term; it's unclear what is meant by 'rational' (it's certainly not clear that it simply means 'not irrational').
On the contrary, I am sure you appreciate that precision and clarity are vital in making any kind of headway in philosophical debates.
As for the Coyne article, there is no contradiction in acknowledging that someone has a right to say something, while also maintaining that one ought not to have said it. That hardly constitutes an attack on a person’s freedom of speech.
Veidt was right!
Perhaps I'm just not understanding the term 'rational' correctly.
I would associate the term with the idea of reasonableness. I can well see how there might be valid arguments for and against the notion that God exists. But I cannot see how there could be sound arguments on both sides. I can see that it might be rational for different people in different contexts to believe or not believe, but I cannot see how it could be rational for a person to either believe or not believe (as opposed to adopting a position of agnosticism.)
Veidt was right!