Atheists are having it too easy.

[ibis]

Originally Posted by Almanac

So you keep saying.

Yes, indeed I do.

Originally Posted by Almanac

So you define morality as subjective. But you think definitions don't matter. (So obviously there is no starting point if the term lacks even semantic content).

Well, no, that definition doesn't make morality either subjective or objective - it would work with either, by refining the terms slightly.

Subjective:

a set of behaviours or behavioural rules (or even mental attitudes) that attempts to maximise what one personally defines to be good, and minimise what one personally defines to be bad

Objective:

a set of behaviours or behavioural rules (or even mental attitudes) that attempts to maximise what one defines to be good, and minimise what one defines to be bad, and where what one defines as good and bad is as close as possible to what is objectively good and bad

In the latter case we still need to allow for human interpretation, since the evidence is overwhelming that if there is such a thing as objective morality, very few humans have a good grasp on it.

Originally Posted by Almanac

If A believes p to be good and B believes p to be bad is there a contradiction between what they think?

Obviously, yes. Go on...

[Almanac]

Originally Posted by ibis

Yes, indeed I do.

Indeed you do. The difference between fact and value notwithstanding. Do you see any difficulty at all with getting an "ought" from an "is"? Can you even see that there might be a problem? It was precisely at the point where I raised this point that you, on each occasion, accused me of begging the question. For you, even to raise the difficulty is to beg the question but that's because you are already assuming your position to be true- facts are value neutral- so when someone like me asks how subjective values emerge from facts you pounce on them and accuse them of begging the question by assuming in one way or another that subjective values can't emerge from facts. Well, no. Just wanted you to explain what exactly you mean and how this process occurs.

Well, no, that definition doesn't make morality either subjective or objective - it would work with either, by refining the terms slightly.

In the latter case we still need to allow for human interpretation, since the evidence is overwhelming that if there is such a thing as objective morality, very few humans have a good grasp on it.

One definiton is still subjective and the other objective. No amount of human activity can obscure objectivity, assuming it's there in whatever sphere of human experience.

Obviously, yes. Go on..

I'll skip to the point. If the truth about morality is that there is no truth about morality then it follows that each person’s moral code is right for him. And if his moral code is right for him then it’s true for him. But if a person’s moral system is absolutist then his moral code is right for him but objectively not true (because it’s based on a false belief). But if it’s not true objectively then we know what is true objectively and if we know what is true objectively how can there be no objective truth about morality?

[ibis]

Originally Posted by Almanac

Indeed you do. The difference between fact and value notwithstanding. Do you see any difficulty at all with getting an "ought" from an "is"? Can you even see that there might be a problem? It was precisely at the point where I raised this point that you, on each occasion, accused me of begging the question. For you, even to raise the difficulty is to beg the question but that's because you are already assuming your position to be true- facts are value neutral- so when someone like me asks how subjective values emerge from facts you pounce on them and accuse them of begging the question by assuming in one way or another that subjective values can't emerge from facts. Well, no. Just wanted you to explain what exactly you mean and how this process occurs.

I'm not quite certain what you're getting at there - are you saying that if there is no such objective thing as morality, then there is no way to derive morality from observation? If so, you are entirely wrong, unless your definition of morality includes the precondition that morality be something objective. As far as I can see, that's exactly what your definition does include, which is why I point out the question you're begging is whether it should include it.

Originally Posted by Almanac

One definiton is still subjective and the other objective.

Yes, I know - that's the point I was making. The extent to which I define morality leaves it open whether there is, or is not, such a thing as objective morality, because my original definition has to be modified in order to make a statement in either direction. I don't entirely dismiss the possibility of an objective morality, but I don't see where it could come from, and haven't seen anything like an adequate argument for it.

Originally Posted by Almanac

I'll skip to the point. If the truth about morality is that there is no truth about morality then it follows that each person’s moral code is right for him. And if his moral code is right for him then it’s true for him. But if a person’s moral system is absolutist then his moral code is right for him but objectively not true (because it’s based on a false belief). But if it’s not true objectively then we know what is true objectively and if we know what is true objectively how can there be no objective truth about morality?

As far as I can tell from that slightly tangled paragraph, you're attempting to claim that if there is no objectively true moral code, but someone claims that their moral code is objectively true, then because we 'objectively' know that that's not the case, then there is either (a) such a thing as an objective morality, because otherwise we would not be able to make such a statement - or at least, (b) we can make objectively true/false statements about morality.

The former would be obvious codswallop, the latter quite true but irrelevant to your argument that there is such a thing as an objective morality.

Apply the same argument to Santa Claus - because we can objectively say that Santa Claus doesn't exist, then there is an objective truth about Santa Claus. Clearly that's true. Does it prove the existence of Santa Claus? Equally clearly not.

[Mercurial]

Originally Posted by Almanac

No that's not what I meant. I mean that we use moral language which is founded on the notion of an objective morality irrespective of concrete circumstances: praising for being right, blaming for being wrong, quarrelling about who's right and wrong, counselling people, punishing people for being wrong, admonishing people to do the right thing. We use these terms and we understand their use. As language is formed from experience- our experience of ourselves and the world- these words and others like them express our experience of morality.

The rest of your post was not really relevant but I am glad that you mentioned the infinite regress problem. It was obvious that you could see it even pages back. It is a standard argument against moral relativism. One has to understand it first though.

I'm not sure how that is different from what I took you to mean by the phrase 'moral language' and I'm still not seeing where your argument moves beyond suggesting that morality is objective simply because most people behave as though it is. I still don't know what it means to have an 'experience of morality', which is surely not the same thing as having an experience of someone using moral language, however it's defined.

[Foghorn]

Originally Posted by sondagefaux

Is Catholicism the only religion in the world???!!!!!!!

Did I claim it was?

[Almanac]

Originally Posted by ibis

I'm not quite certain what you're getting at there - are you saying that if there is no such objective thing as morality, then there is no way to derive morality from observation? If so, you are entirely wrong, unless your definition of morality includes the precondition that morality be something objective. As far as I can see, that's exactly what your definition does include, which is why I point out the question you're begging is whether it should include it.

The naturalistic fallacy is often claimed to be a formal fallacy. It was described and named by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica. Moore stated that a naturalistic fallacy was committed whenever a philosopher attempts to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of the term "good" in terms of one or more natural properties (such as "pleasant", "more evolved", "desired", etc.).

Naturalistic fallacy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Yes, I know - that's the point I was making. The extent to which I define morality leaves it open whether there is, or is not, such a thing as objective morality, because my original definition has to be modified in order to make a statement in either direction. I don't entirely dismiss the possibility of an objective morality, but I don't see where it could come from, and haven't seen anything like an adequate argument for it.

Well there is also the evidence. Evidence from interior experience (conscience and how it represents its claims to us), from our interpersonal behaviour and the moral language that we use, as well as from our collective moral tradition:

Illustrations of the Tao

As far as I can tell from that slightly tangled paragraph, you're attempting to claim that if there is no objectively true moral code, but someone claims that their moral code is objectively true, then because we 'objectively' know that that's not the case, then there is either (a) such a thing as an objective morality, because otherwise we would not be able to make such a statement - or at least, (b) we can make objectively true/false statements about morality.

The former would be obvious codswallop, the latter quite true but irrelevant to your argument that there is such a thing as an objective morality.

Apply the same argument to Santa Claus - because we can objectively say that Santa Claus doesn't exist, then there is an objective truth about Santa Claus. Clearly that's true. Does it prove the existence of Santa Claus? Equally clearly not.

No but there is some content where we're concerned- the subjective or objective value terms 'good' and 'evil.' There is something otherwise we couldn't even have this discussion; the question is the nature of that something.

Now tell me if in a democracy, people (a majority) voted in favour of enslaving other people, would it still be a good law if it remained illegal?

[Almanac]

Originally Posted by Mercurial

I'm not sure how that is different from what I took you to mean by the phrase 'moral language' and I'm still not seeing where your argument moves beyond suggesting that morality is objective simply because most people behave as though it is. I still don't know what it means to have an 'experience of morality', which is surely not the same thing as having an experience of someone using moral language, however it's defined.

The way we use moral language implies an understanding of morality as objective. Otherwise why would we praise people for being right or blame them for being wrong? Why would we reward or punish them for being right or wrong? Why would we say things like, "I think that's right" or "That seems unjust." In all these an understanding of morality as objective is implied. What are we doing when we make statements (or perform actions) like these (which we all do)? Do we or do we not think that we ought to do some things and ought not to do others? This is the moral experience I am referring to. Is not our moral language formed from this experience? And what kind of understanding of this moral experience is reflected in our moral language?

[Mercurial]

Originally Posted by Almanac

The way we use moral language implies an understanding of morality as objective. Otherwise why would we praise people for being right or blame them for being wrong? Why would we reward or punish them for being right or wrong? Why would we say things like, "I think that's right" or "That seems unjust." In all these an understanding of morality as objective is implied. What are we doing when we make statements (or perform actions) like these (which we all do)? Do we or do we not think that we ought to do some things and ought not to do others? This is the moral experience I am referring to. Is not our moral language formed from this experience? And what kind of understanding of this moral experience is reflected in our moral language?

Not necessarily. We might still praise people for being right or blame them for being wrong if we understood that they were behaving according to the same moral rules. You could believe that morality is relative to time or to culture, for example and engage in moral talk with members who share the same moral sphere as you do.

And I still don't see how this gets you closer to objective morality. I agree that we intuiviely feel that some things are good and some bad, but this intuition can be stretched across space and time to the point where it seems very difficult to see what would remain as universal which could not be explained as easily by the notion of a shared human experience rather than something external.

[Almanac]

Originally Posted by Mercurial

Not necessarily. We might still praise people for being right or blame them for being wrong if we understood that they were behaving according to the same moral rules. You could believe that morality is relative to time or to culture, for example and engage in moral talk with members who share the same moral sphere as you do.

The point is we never do this. Unless by strained, conscious effort. Think about it. We may deny morality is objective but only after it has first been affirmed as so by our experience.

And I still don't see how this gets you closer to objective morality. I agree that we intuiviely feel that some things are good and some bad, but this intuition can be stretched across space and time to the point where it seems very difficult to see what would remain as universal which could not be explained as easily by the notion of a shared human experience rather than something external.

The evidence is from our everyday intersubjective experience of morality and the moral language formed from this experience. Space and time have little to do with it since we're not discussing shared moral values- which may happen to be the result of a happy coincidence or whatever.

[fionnmccool]

I kind of got fatigued by this thread its so long

Originally Posted by Almanac

The point is we never do this. Unless by strained, conscious effort. Think about it. We may deny morality is objective but only after it has first been affirmed as so by our experience.

Is there any established objective morality or moral code ?

Isn't morality man made ? We can debate actions and their consequences but at the end of the day we end up with a set of imperfect laws because people are not perfect. Those laws become refined over time. An objective and complete set of laws is an ideal to strive towards but until this far away moment towards infinity don't we we still have to work on our imperfect legal system and imperfect moral codes? For example 50 years ago nobody would have even entertained the idea that leaving your tap running could be immoral since it wastes water.
If moral codes are not a work in progress then society would never change. A lot of changes have occurred over the last century. I kind of find this concept of claimed complete objectivity to be like a recurring decimal in that it grows and grows yet it never reaches its goal in the present moment but instead at some ideal moment. Claiming that society already knows everything there is to know could be a recipe for stagnation.